Series is a forum for stimulating discussion and eliciting feedback on ongoing and recently completed research and policy studies undertaken by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) staff, consultants, or resource persons. The series deals with key economic and development problems, particularly those facing the Asia and Pacific region; as well as conceptual, analytical, or methodological issues relating to project/program economic analysis, and statistical data and measurement. The series aims to enhance the knowledge on Asia's development and policy challenges; strengthen analytical rigor and quality of ADB's country partnership strategies, and its subregional and country operations; and improve the quality and availability of statistical data and development indicators for monitoring development effectiveness.
I. Introduction
The importance of the middle class to economic growth lies beyond what is captured by income or consumption measures. Yet, economists have tended to define the middle class using features solely based on consumption or income despite large variations in perceptions of what people consider middle class. This paper brings a different dimension to the middle class discussion by basing analysis on people's self-identified perceptions of social class and their reported values. In particular, we attempt to answer the following questions:
What are the characteristics of people who are "middle class"?
(ii) How do middle class values differ from the values of lower class or upper class? Are middle class values necessarily more conducive to economic growth than other classes or are values that are related to economic growth more simply a factor of increases in income?
(iii) How may inequality within the country, level of income, and size of the middle class potentially affect values of the different classes?
To answer these questions we use data from the World Values Survey (WVS) aggregated file covering a large set of developing and developed countries from 1996 to 2008. We find that there is generally a wide range of variation in what people consider middle class, but perceived class status is largely related to higher education, more skilled and stable jobs, and the ability to "save", which are all characteristics of people with higher incomes.
Moreover, values that are related to stronger and more stable economic growth appears consistent with a story of raising class status, potentially through income and education, rather than a story of the importance of the middle class itself. The only exception is in regard to political activism, which shows that the middle class has a higher tendency to take part in political activities than both the lower and upper classes.
In Section II we discuss the related literature that has covered the relation of values to human capital investments and economic growth. In Section III we describe the WVS data used in our analysis. Section IV examines the characteristics and determinants of people who consider themselves middle class. Section V examines how class status, in particular middle class status, relates to values that are strongly considered to foster economic growth. As we are largely interested in how these values vary among different regions, Section VI provides a more in-depth look at how values differs across different regional economies. Finally Section VII concludes.
II. Related Literature
Research into values and its connection to the labor market, investments, and economic growth is a highly important area of research. Graham (2009) notes that surveys measuring happiness, values, and perceptions allow researchers to gain insights into the relative importance that respondents attach to various public policies and to the allocation of public expenditures. It helps provide a gauge between policy reforms and the public support for such reforms.
A. Locus of Control and Investments
While the foundation of economics is based on rational choice models, economists have increasingly recognized the importance of focusing on behavioral models of choice that can lead to differences in outcomes and individual choice. One strand of the literature has focused on locus of control that refers to psychological aspects relating to individual perception of how much control they have over their lives versus how much of their lives is determined by fate or environmental factors. Coleman and Deleire (2003) show that the youth in the United States who perceive greater control over their lives are more likely to invest in more education and to continue on to university-level education. Likewise Baron and Cobb-Clark (2010) examine school completion rates in Australia and find that an individual with greater perception of control over his/her life is more likely to enter higher education.
However, there is some indication that locus of control may merely be a proxy for cognitive ability, and thus may be attributing perceptions to completion of schooling and schooling investment when in fact the perceptions are correct assessments of one's ability. Cebi (2007) finds that even after accounting for the cognitive ability of an individual, those with greater locus of control obtain higher earnings on the labor market. In fact labor market returns are further verified by Caliendo, Cobb-Clark, and Uhlendorff (2010) who find that on a panel data of individuals in Germany that allows one to control for individual characteristics, individuals with greater locus of control are more willing to search for a new job and therefore obtain higher earnings upon job entry. Such findings are further supported by Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) who propose a theory of how parents shape their children's preferences in response to economic incentives. They find that middle class families are especially prone to developing patience and work ethic for their children, and can explain how class-specific attitudes that are rooted in the nature of pre-industrial professions can become key determinants of success once industrialization transforms the economic landscape.
B. Perceptions, Values, and Economic Growth
Most happiness studies find that within countries, wealthier people are on average happier than poorer people, but that across countries and over time, one finds little relationship between increases in per capita income and average happiness levels. Since Easterlin (1974) highlighted this common finding, economists have sought to explain this apparent paradox. Easterlin in particular interpreted these findings as indicative that after a certain point, relative, rather than absolute, levels of income matter to personal wellbeing. In revisiting this paradox, Sacks, Stevenson, and Wolfers (2010) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) look at happiness within countries, across countries, and over time for 140 different countries. They find that while absolute income does play an important part in well-being, subjective well-being grows with material living standards.
The fact that there is a feedback relationship between values and economic growth is apparent in this continued debate. Kohut et al. (2009) examine people's opinions about democracy and social issues, finding that as wealth increases, individuals tend to be more likely to hold democratic values, emphasize free speech, de-emphasize religion, and care more about the environment. Meanwhile, Johnson and Lenartowicz (1998) look at why some economies such as Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China have experienced high levels of growth, while other economies have experienced low or negative real growth. They find at least partial evidence of a relationship between ideology and economic growth.
Trust may be another aspect that is highly conducive to strong economic growth, and this is related to Easterly (2001) who finds that lower ethnic polarization and a larger middle class lead to higher levels of economic growth. One reason why less polarization and more trust may lead to strong economic growth is provided by Tausch and Heshmati (2009) who examine social cohesion as a way out of the modernization trap that accepts government corruption, fraud, and cheating. Moreover, Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenan (2009) empirically examine how levels of regional trust as measured by the WVS and rule of law can improve aggregate productivity by facilitating greater firm decentralization. They find that trust in a region is associated with larger firms and a different pattern of industry specialization, and that it can explain why the most productive firms have a smaller market share in developing countries such as India. More specifically they point to the inability to decentralize in developing countries as a constraint that prevents the most productive firms from effectively expanding. Similarly, Fukuyama (1995) argues that more prosperous countries, such as Germany and the United States, are those where people can conduct business relations informally on the basis of trust. However, in countries where business deals are made on the basis of dysfunctional loyalties such as family relationships, these can induce governments to intervene with policies that distort incentives and retard economic growth.
Values taught through religion such as honesty, thrift, willingness to work hard, and openness to strangers may also have potential positive benefits on economic growth as described by Barro (2004) . Barro and McCleary (2004) find that religious beliefs are highly determinant of economic growth in cross country data, but that when these religious influences involve significant time in attending church economic growth is negative. They identify the causal effects of religion on economic growth by instrumenting for average religious beliefs using dummy variables for existence of state religion and existence of regulated market structure where government approves or appoints church leaders.
Overall, the literature shows that incorporating values into research can be highly informative about the shape and success of growth and how growth may affect values. This brings an additional perspective to why the middle class matters beyond the reasons suggested by Banerjee and Duflo (2008) . Thus, we attempt to add to this literature by examining people along different parts of the income distribution, specifically focusing on three categories of class definitions, namely, lower class, middle class, and upper class; and by examining how the general income level and the shape of the distribution may ultimately affect people's outlooks, and potentially retard or foster growth-inducing values and behavior.
III. Data and Descriptives
The WVS data contains a wide range of information on cultural, social, and political values from a large set of countries (see www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). Survey collection began in 1981 with 14 countries and had subsequently expanded to capture a greater number of countries in each successive wave. So far five waves have been covered through 2008. In our analysis, we focused on the last year for each country that responded to the class status question. This resulted in a coverage of 80 distinct countries with 12 of the surveys occurring between 1996 and 1999, and the remaining 68 countries having survey years between 2000 and 2008. The countries in our sample are listed in the Appendix. We focus on individuals between the ages of 25-55, to better capture the values of productive working members of society, with the number of raw observations for each country ranging from a low of 238 individuals in the Dominican Republic, to a high of 2,138 observations for Egypt. In our sample and analysis, each individual included in our sample population was reweighted so that the sum of the weights for a given country was equal to that country's population in 2008.
We focused on six types of values covered by the WVS that are considered to contribute to greater economic growth and increased welfare. These values were then used to form indexes representing market competition, upward mobility, trust, gender equality, value of science and technology, and political activism. The indexes in our analysis were constructed by rebasing the answers to the chosen questions, seen in the note to Table  1 , so that their value ranged between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 considered to represent values that are more conducive to economic growth or political accountability. We then took the average of nonmissing responses to different questions so that each question was weighted equally in the index. Table 1 reports the mean values of indexes by class, while Table 2 presents the basic descriptive statistics and summary distributions of variables used in our analysis. We see from Table 1 that except for technology adoption, the upper class has more liberal views (i.e., views that place less restrictions on business and promote greater equality) on all broad types of values, as shown by the high average index values, compared to those of the lower and middle classes across all countries. Most notable is that compared to the lower and upper classes, the middle class tends to have a more advanced view regarding technology. v45, v117, v119, v121; v61, v62, v63, v161; v52, v115, v116, v120, v122; v47, Political ActivismCodes v27, v28, v29, v32, v95, v123, v230 . Sources: Authors' estimates. 
IV. Determinants of Identifying Oneself as Belonging to a Certain Class
There is little consensus on how to define the middle class even when basing the definition purely on income or expenditure measures. 1 A simple examination of people's reported middle class status versus their reported position in the income distribution, as seen in Figure 1 for nine countries in Asia, shows a wide variation in what people consider to be middle class, which is unlikely to be captured purely by income or expenditure measures. This section attempts to provide some general information on what people perceive as their class status based on various demographic characteristics. It allows us to provide a more general story about the influences on class status and the relation of class status to values that likely drive economic growth. In particular we attempt to find estimates for the following specification:
where Y ict * is a latent unobserved variable representing a value that translates into an individual's selection of a certain class. Hence we estimate the probability that a person chooses a certain class status conditional on different demographic characteristics as follows:
where j = 1 (lower class), j = 2 (middle class), j = 3 (upper class). In d o n e s ia M a la y s ia P a k is ta n P h il ip p in e s T h a il a n d V ie t N a m 1st-2nd Decile 3rd-4th Decile 5th-6th Decile 7th-8th Decile 9th-10 Decile Source: Authors' estimates.
The vector of coefficients β on the independent variables, X ict , consists of household and individual characteristics as well as characteristics that capture social and economic factors at the country level. This includes inequality represented by the Gini; average level of income of the country; measures of ethnolinguistic diversity, 2 representing deep cleavages (ELF(1)) and shallow cleavages (ELF (15)); and region fixed effects. The inclusion of the ethnolinguistic variables is meant to proxy for cultural heterogeneity, which likely impacts class status and is correlated with a wide range of outcomes, fostering civil war, undermining growth, and hindering redistribution and provision of public goods.
The corresponding marginal effects are presented in Table 3 . We find that household and individual characteristics influencing self-perceptions of social class are educational attainment; household head's occupation; nature of job or occupation (i.e., whether tasks are manual, practice some degree of independence, and is paid employment); whether or not the household saved money during the past year; the degree of income inequality in the country; and per capita gross domestic product (GDP) level. The variables reflecting sex; age; indicators for living with parents; institution of occupation; nature of job (i.e., whether manual or cognitive, whether routine or creative); urban residence; and civil status are not significant. As expected, higher educational attainment and more skilled occupations are associated with higher probabilities of choosing a higher class status. In the case of measures of ethnic diversity, marginal effects for fractionalization are shown to have differing impacts dependent on whether there are superficial or deep cleavages within the country. The negative marginal effect of ELF(1) for middle class means that a person who belongs to a more ethnically diverse society (based on deeper cleavages) is less likely to perceive himself/herself belonging to the middle class than one in a less diverse society. On the other hand, the positive coefficient of ELF(1) for lower class means that, controlling for region of residence and certain household/individual characteristics, a person in a more diverse society is more likely to classify himself/ herself as belonging to the lower class than someone living in a less diverse society. This is consistent with findings that lower ethnic polarization is empirically associated with higher income, higher growth, more education, better health, better infrastructure, better economic policies, less political instability, less civil war, more social modernization, and more democracy (Easterly 2001) . ELF(15) representing more superficial cleavages (i.e., more refined language differentiations) shows exactly the opposite trend, that is, higher ethnic diversity is associated with greater tendency of considering oneself in the upper or middle classes. This may perhaps arise from more superficial cleavages, indicating that people's worlds are more insular, which changes their perception of their class standing in a positive way, or that people are more likely to generalize their class identity to a broader group. For all covariates, marginal effects for upper and middle classes have identical signs while the opposite sign is observed for the lower class. We also find that the degree of ethnic diversity within a society is highly determinate of a person's perceptions of class status across countries (Figure 2 ). Source: Authors' estimates.
V. Attitudes and Values of the Middle Class
We showed that class status is largely related to characteristics that proxy for higher income, the cultural construct, and divisiveness of a country. However, we seek to examine how perceived class status relates to values that are highly related to higher economic growth and greater accountability in public services. This examination is undertaken by regressing class status and characteristics, capturing a country's economic and social construct on six indexes representing market competition, upward mobility, trust, gender equality, value of science and technology, and political activism. In particular we run the specification as follows:
In the model, lower class is represented by LC, upper class is represented by UC, and ζ represents region fixed effects. Our coefficients of interest are the β's representing the marginal difference in values represented by index scores between someone who is lower class or upper class versus someone who is middle class. Our inclusion of a country's average level of income and the Gini are thought to affect a person's perceptions outside of its effect that influences class status. Model 1 in Table 4a shows the regression estimates for each of the six indexes for models with controls for region effects, income inequality, and country's log per capita GDP. People who perceive themselves as middle class are found to have values that are more likely to contribute to economic growth than the lower class for all six indexes, but generally have less liberal values and attitudes than the upper class relating to market competition, gender equality, upward mobility, and trust. For political activism and technology adoption, the self-perceived middle class is more likely to play a part in politics and advocate the use of technology than the lower class, but are not distinguishable from the upper class on these measures. 3 In Model 2 of Table 4b , we include the ethnolinguistic cleavage variables as they are also likely to highly affect values of an individual independent of their effect through the class choice. We find that fractionalization within the society at a more superficial level is associated with greater market competition, gender equality, and trust, but less associated with perceived ability to be upwardly mobile, and less likely to advocate use of technology. However, deeper cleavages represented by ELF(1) generally has the opposite effect as it is associated with less market competition, less trust, but greater perception of upward mobility. Moreover, deeper cleavages are associated with people having greater political activism that is consistent with network effects, which may arise from having a larger population within a society who has similar goals. 
VI. Variations in Values across Regions
We examine how values dependent on class status vary across regions, to see whether a new paradigm is being created by classes in different societies compared to the western countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Moreover, it allows us to shed some light on whether class values may possibly explain the lower rates of growth in some countries after controlling for inequality (or size of selfperceived middle class). In particular we estimate the following regression:
I ict = α+β ζ LC ict +β ζ UC ict +δlog(GDP ct )+γGINI ct +ζ+ε ictt (4) Table 5a shows the estimated coefficients from these regressions. Figure 3a , which presents the estimated value of the indexes over the six value types, shows that there is a high degree of variation across regions. In particular, East Asia has values that are much more conducive to market competition than many other regions except in the OECD and Latin American and Caribbean countries. While there is little differentiation between classes in East Asia in terms of outlook of gender equality, they are relatively higher than many other regions except developing Europe and Latin America, though still far lower than OECD countries. Perceptions of upward mobility are relatively high in East Asia, as they have values or perceptions of upward mobility that are higher than OECD countries; while in South Asia (most likely driven by India), there are relatively low perceptions of upward mobility. Trust in East Asia is fairly high, as in South Asia, although the relationship is different among classes. Finally, East Asia has one of the lowest rates of political activism but lower rates of belief in technology than many other regions. On the other hand, rates of political activism in South Asia are the highest among the regions except in comparison with OECD countries. Moreover, the middle class in the region has higher rates of political activism and technology adoption than the lower and upper classes. The degree of differentiation between classes is fairly large. Overall, the differences in values seem to somewhat explain the higher rates of growth in East Asia versus South Asia. In general, more economically liberal values that can contribute to higher economic growth generally have a positive monotonic relationship with higher class status, indicating the close relationship that class status has with incomes. However, the results do seem to support the role of the middle class in the political sphere in democratic societies (India and many of the OECD countries) where the middle class is on average found to be more politically active and thus may play a significant role in making governments more accountable.
Figure 3a also shows that OECD countries clearly hold more economically liberal views over the other regions except in terms of values relating to upward mobility and technology adoption. Further, the middle class in the OECD countries tend to have more advanced views compared to both the lower and the upper classes except in terms of values relating to market competition. East Asia seems to be the only region where there are very little differences in values among the classes as shown by the almost flat lines in all six charts. Moreover, a great deal of trust in society exists in East Asia than in all the other regions except for the OECD countries, but East Asia has less radical views when it comes to political activism. Compared to the lower and upper classes, the middle class are less trusting in Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia; more supportive of gender equality in OECD, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Central Asia; more politically active in OECD, South Asia, and developing countries of Europe; has the highest perception of upward mobility in OECD and Latin America and the Caribbean; and more receptive to technology in OECD, developing Europe, and South Asia. The two measures of ethnolinguistic cleavages are shown in Table 5b . However, these measures did not result in any significant changes in the estimated index values by region and by social class (Figure 3b) . The results suggest that there may be strong cultural aspects that can subsequently hinder or help economic growth in line with Minkov and Blagoev (2009) and Pryor (2005) . 
VII. Conclusion
Our examination provided a different perspective on class status that is based on selfperceptions rather than merely income or expenditure measures. Namely, we explored what some of the key determinants are to one reporting a certain class status. It was found that key characteristics associated with higher incomes largely determines one's perception of their class status, but that it is affected negatively by higher inequality within a country. Yet one's reported class status is only one component of the story. The examination into the relationship between class status and the average values of individuals found that higher class status is generally related to values that are considered to foster economic growth. However, there is a nonmonotonic trend in the relationship between class status and political activism, and to a lesser degree in relation to technology adoption. The middle class is on average more politically active than the lower or upper classes. This is consistent with the story that the middle class is important in its demand for better goods and services and keeping governments accountable.
There is generally a high degree of variation across regions. In particular, compared to the OECD countries, many of the developing regions place lower values on market competition, gender equality, trust, and political activism, whereas upward mobility and belief in the benefits of technology are roughly at par with or lower than a number of developing regions. In general, many of these values seem driven by income factors.
This seems to imply that policies that try to raise a person's perceived class status through education and better jobs are highly important in fostering values that can contribute to higher economic growth. However, where the size of the middle class could really matter, versus just in its relationship to increasing incomes, is in its contribution to politics, as the middle class is much more likely to participate in political activities. The variation across regions indicates that the social and cultural makeup of a country is likely indicative of whether values within a country are more conducive to economic growth. This means that some countries may have much deeper and complex issues that may prevent growth in values that lead to higher economic growth. Therefore, fostering values that can help economies grow may not simply be resolved by policies that attempt to increase income and move people up in income class status.
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